



Seminario de Microeconomía Aplicada - Relational Contracts with Heterogeneous Principals: Theory, Experiment, and Implications for the Conservation of Rented Farmland

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Abstract: We propose a contract-theoretic approach to investigate how farmer operators who rent farmland adjust their commitment to land stewardship based on the type of landlord and the expected length of the rental relationship. Utilizing relational contract theory and experimental economics methods, we explore how operators allocate effort towards conservation practices in response to different landlord types and expected relationship lengths. The analysis contributes to understanding the farmland rental market and its environmental implications. The findings have implications for soil conservation and environmental policy.

José Nuño-Ledesma: I am broadly interested in mechanism design and contract theory. In my research, I primarily address issues in pricing, nutritional policy, natural resource management, and labour economics. I joined the faculty of the University of Guelph's department of Food, Agricultural, and Resource Economics in January 2020. I transitioned to my current position after having worked for the Mexican Central Bank's division of Economic Research. I am an alumnus of both the University of Minnesota (M.S. 2014, Fulbright grantee) and Purdue University (PhD 2018).

Tiempo de exposición: 1 hora