



CANCELADO Seminario 576: The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision

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Resumen del documento: "The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision" Using novel data on supranational agreements we document that there are large differences in the propensity and the intensity with which countries cooperate in the supervision of their banks. Exploiting bank-level variation arising from the geographical dispersion of cross-border banks and supervisory cooperation, we show that such cooperation is effective in improving bank stability. The effectiveness is higher for smaller and less complex banks, and when supervisors are more stringent and have access to higher quality information. We also provide evidence that the incidence and intensity of supervisory cooperation vary across country pairs in line with differences in economic costs and benefits of cooperation.

Hora: 12:00 m. (refrigerio) y 12:30 p. m. (inicio del seminario).

Tiempo de exposición: 12:30 p. m. a 1:30 p. m.

Idioma de la exposición: Inglés