



# Seminario 432: Quota policies and career advancement: Evidence from Indian politics

Seminario 432: Quota policies and career advancement: Evidence from Indian politics  
Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Entrada libre. Indispensable inscribirse en el siguiente vínculo: Inscripciones

**Hora:** 12:00 m. (refrigerio) y 12:30 p. m. (inicio del seminario)

**Tiempo de exposición:** 12:30 p. m. a 2:00 p.m.

**Lugar:** Banco de la República, carrera 7 # 14-78, piso 13 (Sala de prensa), Bogotá D.C.

**Idioma de la exposición:** Inglés

**Resumen del documento:** A common argument for quota policies is their potential to increase the participation of targeted groups in positions that are not directly subjected to quotas or after quotas are no longer in place. I test this argument empirically in the context of India, where one third of local political leadership seats are randomly assigned over time to be held by a woman. Quotas increase the number of female candidates who later contest seats in state and national legislatures, where such policies do not exist. The effects can be explained by repeat candidacies of career politicians and new candidacies by politicians who gain particular experience from the quotas. Effect magnitudes imply that the policy accounts for a substantial portion of the increase in female candidates for these bodies since the start of the policy. Representation effects are present only when female candidates run on major party tickets. Overall, quotas do not induce permanent change in the presence of female candidates in higher office due to the low probability of a female candidate winning an election and effects on candidacy subsiding over time.

Image not found or type unknown



Quota policies and career advancement: Evidence from Indian politics

Si desea inscribirse a la lista de correos del Seminario semanal de Economía de Bogotá para recibir en su cuenta la información sobre nuestra programación, debe remitir un correo electrónico a la dirección [seminariossemanales@banrep.gov.co](mailto:seminariossemanales@banrep.gov.co) con el asunto "Inscripción a la lista de correos", cabe resaltar que por esta cuenta no se reciben inscripciones a los seminarios. Consulte nuestras Políticas y lineamientos

generales de protección de datos personales.

Fuente: <https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/sse-bogota-432>