

Seminario 423: Information Policies and Higher Education Choices: Experimental Evidence from Colombia

Seminario 423: Information Policies and Higher Education Choices: Experimental Evidence from Colombia
Candidato a PhD en Economía, University of Illinois

Co-autores: Leonardo Bonilla, Nicolas L. Bottan (Department of Economics, University of Illinois)

Entrada libre. Indispensable inscribirse en el siguiente vínculo: [Inscripciones](#)

Hora: 12:00 m. (refrigerio) y 12:30 p. m. (inicio del seminario)

Tiempo de exposición: 12:30 p. m. a 2:00 p.m.

Lugar: Banco de la República, carrera 7 # 14-78, piso 13 (Sala de prensa), Bogotá D.C.

Idioma de la exposición: Español

Resumen del documento: This paper studies whether providing information on funding opportunities and college premiums by degree-college pairs affects higher education decisions in a developing country. We conducted a randomized controlled trial in Bogotá, Colombia, on a representative sample of 120 urban public high schools, 60 of which received a 35-minute informational talk delivered by local college graduates. Using survey data linked to administrative records, we analyze student beliefs and evaluate the intervention. Findings show that most students overestimate true college premiums and are generally unaware of funding options. The talk does not affect earning beliefs but improves knowledge of financing programs, especially among the poor. There is no evidence that information disclosure affects post-secondary enrollment. However, students in treated schools who do enroll choose more selective colleges. These positive effects are mostly driven by students from better socioeconomic backgrounds. We conclude that information policies are ineffective to raise college enrollment in contexts with significant academic and financial barriers to entry, but may potentially affect certain students' choice of college.

Image not found or type unknown



Information Policies and Higher Education Choices Experimental Evidence from Colombia

Si desea inscribirse a la lista de correos del Seminario semanal de Economía de Bogotá para recibir en su cuenta la información sobre nuestra programación, debe remitir un correo electrónico a la dirección seminariossemanales@banrep.gov.co con el asunto "Inscripción a la lista de correos", cabe resaltar que por esta cuenta no se reciben inscripciones a los seminarios. Consulte nuestras Políticas y lineamientos generales de protección de datos personales.